There are significant operational, political, and organizational risks inherent in the implementation of United States Northern Command, or NORTHCOM. The thesis of this paper is to demonstrate that the NORTHCOM commander in chief and his staff can mitigate these risks by carefully managing the relationship between the command and the other key interagency players within the federal government. In this paper, the author will contend that relationships based on principles of coordination and cooperation can form a solid foundation for the contribution of Northern Command, and more broadly the Department of Defense, to the homeland security arena. This argument will be supported by reviewing the Department's involvement in homeland security issues and previous organizational models used to address those issues, and analyzing the NORTHCOM proposal announced in the 2002 Unified Command Plan. The analysis will identify three potential problems--budget competition, unclear lines of authority and responsibility, and a lack of clear communication, command, and control relationships among interagency players. Recommendations to avoid those problems follow the analysis, including eight specific actions NORTHCOM should take to create effective relationships with its interagency partners.
BACKGROUND
The terrorist attacks carried out by members of the Al Qaeda organization against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were unprecedented in complexity, scope, and lethality. September 11, 2001 has entered the contemporary American lexicon as a synonym for savagery, much the same as December 7, 1941 did for those who fought and won World War II. The impact of the events of that day still resonates through society-from business to education, and from domestic politics to foreign policy. The attacks have become a rallying point for all Americans, and brought back to the collective consciousness of the nation the importance of sacrifice and service in a way no government program ever could.
This watershed event has also dramatically affected United States defense planning.
Since the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union, military professionals and defense analysts alike have expended great effort in defining the proper strategic perspective and force-sizing mechanism for the armed forces of the United States. Planners have wrestled with the notions of "major regional conflicts" versus "major theater wars"; planned for two simultaneous or near-simultaneous conflicts; struggled with understanding the proper force structure and weapons mix to meet the still-undefined "threat"; and wavered between threat-based or capabilities-based schemes to design, organize, train, and equip America's armed forces for the twenty-first century. Yet always the military's focus has been outward, looking to enemies overseas-in their homelands, not our own. Since 11 September, however, there has been a dramatic paradigm shift, as those responsible for the defense of America have looked inward. This noticeable change in the concept of homeland security in the early days of Governor George W. Bush 13 The new arrangement provides other government agencies with a single DoD homeland security point of contact point, perhaps one of the plan's strongest points. It also highlights the supporting nature of the military's involvement in homeland security. In the briefing announcing the Unified Command Plan changes, senior DoD leaders referred to NORTHCOM's role as one of providing support to civil authorities no fewer than sixteen times. 14 Clearly, these leaders hope such repetition and emphasis results in clarity of purpose and unity of effort.
However, the plan does have its weaknesses, and is not without its detractors. Some observers decry the effort as just another Department of Defense reorganization, 15 contend that little will change from previous command arrangements, and conclude that the change is "…just an organizational reshuffling." 16 The location of the new command headquarters--Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado--might prove to be a source of problems if it places the command at too great a distance from the key federal agencies in the Washington, D.C. area that will be its partners in the homeland security mission. 17 The as-yet-undefined relationship between the commander in chief of NORTHCOM and the other geographic CINCs regarding force allocation and apportionment will also prove troublesome, if crises provoke a serious allocation issue.
There are numerous issues in the homeland security arena worthy of study and research. One issue is the international relations aspects of the implementation of Northern
Command. The United States' relationships with her nearest neighbors, Canada and Mexico, will almost certainly change under the existing proposal, regarding not just defense, but also social and economic matters. Domestically, the commander in chief of Northern Command will face an unprecedented challenge in managing relationships with the 535 United States representatives and senators whose constituents live within CINCNORTH's theater, a feat that will require extraordinary political skill. A third issue is the complex relationship between Northern Command and the multitude of government agencies with homeland security responsibilities or concerns. While all are important, this paper, due to its limited scope, will address only the last-the relationship between NORTHCOM and other government agencies.
ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE PROBLEMS IN NORTHCOM'S IMPLEMENTATION
There are numerous possible interagency problems as the implementation of Northern Command moves forward. While there are dangers, there are also ways to avoid those dangers if senior leaders are diligent in carefully defining and clarifying the relationships between NORTHCOM and its homeland security partners. Three primary issues emerge at first glance: budget competition, unclear lines of authority and responsibility, and the need for clear communication, command, and control relationships among interagency players.
Budget Competition
Demands for funding are sure to be sticking points. Battles will be fought between executive branch departments to secure the needed funding for homeland security issues and initiatives. There will be debates regarding funding shortfalls for such agencies as the FBI, FEMA, and the Department of Defense and State and local governments. In these debates, there are likely to be concerted efforts to use the homeland security threat as a means to expand budget authority. There is a limit to Congress' willingness to fund executive branch priorities in lieu of their own priorities; executive branch budget leaders can expect opposition to a certain percentage of executive branch initiatives and addition of Congressional priorities to the appropriations bills for their respective federal agencies. With regard to funding, there are at least two key points of disagreement.
One area of concern will be people. Endstrength, or the number of people (by component or category) in the agency or organization, is a major issue and is a direct contributor to the organization's ability to achieve its mission. It will likely be fiscally untenable to add large numbers of active duty military personnel, reserve military personnel, customs agents, border patrol guards, federal airport security personnel, and FBI agents to the federal workforce all at the same time.
A second area of concern relates to equipment, training, and operations and maintenance funding. The same restrictions would apply; absent an unprecedented infusion of Federal, State, and local dollars, budget officials will have some hard choices to make.
Almost certainly, perceived requirements will exceed the taxpayers' ability to pay for them in a fiscally constrained environment. This amount is in addition to the homeland security portion of the FY02 Emergency Budget Supplemental, which totaled $10.6 billion. 19 However, while this will help meet the needs, these dollars will not fund DoD initiatives for homeland security.
If difficult homeland security funding choices must be made within the executive branch--as they almost certainly will--they are likely to be made when the various executive branch agencies consult with officials of the Office of Management and Budget as the President's annual budget proposal makes its way to Congress for consideration. In these negotiations, OMB officials will expand or curtail budget proposals to meet requirements while staying within the President's desired overall budget figure.
Authority and Responsibility
Ultimately, the budgets for agencies and organizations involved in homeland security will be determined by the tasks assigned to them. This raises the second issue related to the interagency process and homeland security: the matter of unclear authority and responsibility. One of the major questions facing the entire homeland security community is the issue of roles and missions. There is a great deal of uncertainty regarding who is responsible for what tasks regarding the different aspects of homeland security. This division of labor will affect funding, manning levels, leadership concerns, training, and other areas.
The NORTHCOM commander in chief will surely spend considerable time unraveling the 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW TO AVOID THE POSSIBLE PROBLEMS
There are ways to overcome the problems inherent in the NORTHCOM proposal.
For this new command to accomplish its mission, the commanders and staff of the United
States Northern Command must focus on coordination, cooperation, cohesiveness, clarity, and coherence in their relationships with other interagency players.
Coordination NORTHCOM must take coordination with other interagency players to a new level.
Given the command's mission--to be the single point of contact for military support to civil authorities in the context of homeland security--comprehensive coordination is essential.
Three initiatives will be of particular use in achieving a high level of coordination between NORTHCOM and its homeland security partners.
NORTHCOM and the other federal agencies involved in homeland security must take Secretary Rumsfeld has stated that the civilian relationships between the HSC and the DoD will remain the primary connection between the two, 29 yet it appears there is a proper role for NORTHCOM to play in the coordination process. Secretary Rumsfeld succinctly described CINCNORTH's role:
And in this new organizational arrangement, we will have a four-star military person who will be the Northern commander, who will be responsible for being ready to function in a supporting role and assist all of the other elements of the federal government, as well as the state and local governments, to see that those assets and those capabilities that are distinctive and unique to the Department of Defense are in fact promptly put into play to be of assistance to deal with that crisis in City X, if and when that occurs.
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This mission requires NORTHCOM involvement in the policy coordination process to ensure other interagency process participants know and address the operational concerns and capabilities of the lead DoD organization; the HSC/PCC is an appropriate forum to communicate those views.
A second opportunity to ensure effective coordination among the players in the process is the use of permanent Liaison Officer (LNO) positions. NORTHCOM should request LNOs from those agencies to serve on the NORTHCOM staff, and seek to establish permanent LNO positions in the key interagency organizations, including FEMA, the FBI, and others. This exchange of military officers or senior civilians will help to cement the close relationships necessary to coordinate effectively on homeland security issues, particularly in times of crisis. By sharing information and getting to know each other better, both organizations in the arrangement will greatly benefit.
A third initiative is for all the members of the organization to become more aware of the cultural differences between armed services and federal agencies composed of civilian employees. It may be difficult for military members to adapt their viewpoints from one of combat operations to that of supporting and assisting other federal agencies, but that is precisely the task before this new command. To play an effective supporting role for homeland security missions, NORTHCOM must have a deep understanding of the roles and missions of its partners, gained through comprehensive command training programs.
Cooperation
NORTHCOM must also exhibit a marked degree of cooperation with all the interagency players in the homeland security process. This differs from coordination in much the same way that a plan differs from its execution. While the J-5 staff of U.S.
Northern Command must thoroughly coordinate plans with their counterparts in other Federal, State, and local agencies based on anticipated threats, the NORTHCOM J-3 staff must also execute those plans in a spirit of cooperation, only leading when needed, and often following others in the effort.
An effective place to begin the cooperation process would be to consider well the command's supporting role in the homeland security arena. Unless the implementation plan now being developed dramatically changes, Northern Command will support other agencies in protecting America from a wide variety of threats--the military will not lead or command the effort. This may prove to be a difficult transition for some uniformed members to make.
That transition process could begin with viewing the NORTHCOM role from the perspective of the other agencies in the process, the "supported commanders." The command faces the challenge of interacting and communicating with other agencies to determine how best to identify their needs and support them through effective use of the resources available from the Department of Defense.
Leaders must also give special attention to achieving the mission under adverse circumstances. Cooperation in times of crisis is even more difficult than in relatively peaceful situations, and officials must be careful to maintain a cooperative presence in the most extraordinary of events. The terrorist attacks of 11 September are a poignant case study in interagency cooperation under trying conditions, and one that can serve as an excellent example for those likely to be engaged in similar operations in the future.
Cohesiveness
NORTHCOM must also form a relationship with other players in the homeland security interagency process that is characterized by cohesiveness. Together, interagency players must foster a deeply held sense of teamwork. Developing an awareness of camaraderie and shared mission among the disparate organizations that participate in the homeland security issue will take more than just the efforts of Northern Command, but the work could and should begin with the uniformed services. Based on long experience with security missions and assignments between commands, military personnel are well equipped to lead the way in forming cross-functional, networked, operationally effective teams with members of the other federal agencies.
Clarity NORTHCOM must also communicate with their homeland security partners with a high degree of clarity. Communication within an agency or command can be a difficult and frustrating experience; communicating across agency lines can be even more so. The clearer the partners in the process can communicate, the more effectively the team will perform.
A proven way to clarify communications between organizations is to jointly write a Coherence NORTHCOM must also exhibit coherence and consistency in its relationship with the other key players in the homeland security community. This is not to say that the command must, or even should, be rigid or inflexible in its interactions with other agencies, only that officials must constantly regard the human dynamic as plans are formulated, responses are developed, and crises are managed. NORTHCOM commanders and officials at all levels must diligently ensure the personnel assigned to the command for an event or response fully understand not only the mission, but also the relationships and context within which that mission must be accomplished. For many military personnel, an assignment to assist with a homeland security mission may be his or her first experience interacting with civilian employees from other federal agencies. Ensuring personnel understand the appropriate respect, customs, and courtesies for Federal, State, and local officials would be a simple yet important step in developing close and meaningful ties between organization members.
RECOMMENDATIONS
There are eight key recommendations to create effective interagency relationships.
• CINCNORTH or Deputy CINCNORTH should participate in the Homeland Security Council/Policy Coordination Committees to ensure effective communication and understanding at this key policymaking level.
• NORTHCOM should seek to fill permanent Liaison Officer positions on the command staff with selected senior civilians from interagency partners, and seek to assign military officers and senior civilians to permanent Liaison Officer positions on their agency counterpart staffs.
• NORTHCOM must develop a deep awareness of cultural differences between the command and its counterparts, and inculcate that awareness through complete command training programs.
• NORTHCOM must develop and maintain a sharp focus on understanding and meeting the needs of the interagency partners they are tasked to support.
• NORTHCOM must seek to establish a strong teamwork ethic and sense of shared purpose with their homeland security partners.
• NORTHCOM must collaborate on writing, refining, and maintaining Memoranda of Understanding or Agreement with key interagency partners, expressing the operational essentials of their shared relationship.
• NORTHCOM must develop sound, comprehensive, scenario-based plans, then thoroughly and routinely exercise and evaluate them, capture lessons learned, and improve the plans accordingly.
• NORTHCOM must faithfully emphasize the homeland security mission throughout all levels of the command, particularly in the interagency context. Command can be an effective and important contributor to United States national security.
CONCLUSIONS

